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WHY LAWYERS AND LEGAL EDUCATORS SHOULD CARE ABOUT (EPISTEMIC) 
JUSTICE 
 
Melanie Walker, Higher Education & Human Development Research Group, University of the 
Free State, South Africa1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Society shapes the law and the law, we hope, might shape society for the better in turn. 
Legal traditions and practices therefore surely ought to secure for all citizens the 
prerequisites of a life worthy of human dignity. In a speech to the Routledge-Modise Law 
School in Johannesburg in September 2008, Justice Kate O’Regan2 drew on Antony 
Kronman’s theory that one of the main characteristics identifying the practice of Law is 
that it is directly concerned with the public good. Lawyers have a responsibility to foster 
the legal system and the rule of law; at times, this might require them to suggest new laws 
or legislation; at other times, it might require them to criticize judgments which may not 
                                                            
1 Melanie Walker is a Professor at the University of the Free State, South Africa. (walkermj@ufs.ac.za) 
2 O’Regan, K. ‘Lawyering in Our New Constitutional Order.’ (2009). UCT News Alumni Magazine cited in 
Walker. M. Higher Education Pedagogies. (2016) Maidenhead: Open University Press & SRHE  
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appear correct; at other times, they may need to protect the rule of law itself.  
Yet many in the profession - who are working for social justice - perceive there to be a lack 
of such an orientation in lawyers in current times. The former chairperson of the South 
African Human Rights Commission has thus said that “there is a growing perception that 
in spite of South Africa's having one of the best Constitutions in the world; its legal 
practitioners are losing their social consciences”3 reminds us, lawyers should have a 
public calling and obligation for public service to foster the legal system on behalf of the 
marginalized, strengthening constitutional democracy and also changing individual lives.  
This role in strengthening democracy seems of some importance, given that it appears that 
democracy is fragile nearly everywhere. Delivering the Nelson Mandela annual lecture in 
Johannesburg in July 20184, Barack Obama relayed his concerns regarding the subversion 
of free media, the use of social media as a vehicle for hatred and propaganda, as well as 
how some politicians openly lie and discard facts for their own needs.  His lecture sought 
to defend democracy and civil rights as “the better story to tell” and to resist the potential 
“undoing”5 of democracy in current times.  
This leads me to ask how legal education might contribute to addressing this urgent 
                                                            
3 Cited in Sarkin, J. ‘Promoting Access to Justice in South Africa: Should the Legal Profession have a 
Voluntary or Mandatory Role in Providing Legal Services to the Poor?’ (2002). South African Journal on 
Human Rights, 18 (4), 630-644  
4 Marrian, N. and Quintal, G. ‘Obama: resist politics of fear and resentment.’ (2018). Business Day, 18 July:1 
5 Ibid, (n.4)  
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challenge. Here is my claim that follows: epistemic justice and injustice are deeply 
relevant to a just legal system, its practitioners, to clinical practice learning, and hence to 
legal educators in universities like yourselves. I acknowledge, nonetheless, that 
universities and clinical practice settings may act in contradictory ways, with the 
potential to empower, co-existing with the potential to oppress and marginalize. We need 
to work for more of the first and less of the second for justice in a non-ideal world6. 
Epistemic injustice, on which I elaborate later, refers to those forms of unfair treatment 
that relate to issue of knowledge, understanding and participation in communicative 
practices.  Put simply, if you are in a disadvantaged position to influence discourse you 
are subject to epistemic injustice and reduced epistemic agency7. That is, you are wronged 
specifically in your capacity as a knower; you do not have a voice that is recognized, and 
you are placed at an epistemic disadvantage. 
I hope thus to make a persuasive case for adding an epistemic justice-facing capability to 
the eight multi-dimensional, intersecting public-good professional capabilities identified 
by Monica McLean and myself8. We arrived at these both theoretically and empirically 
                                                            
6 Sen, A. The Idea of Justice. (2009) London: Allen Lane 
7 Kidd. I., Medina, J, and Pohlhaus, G. Jr. ‘Introduction’ (2017); in Kidd. I., Medina, J, and Pohlhaus, G. Jr 
(Eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. (2017) London & New York: Routledge 
8 Walker, M., & McLean, M. Professional education, capabilities and contributions to the public good. (2013). 
London: Routledge. 
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using five professional education case studies, including law, at three South African 
universities. The details of the method and the cases can be found in the book9. 
 
CAPABILITIES 
First, a brief outline of what I mean by ‘capabilities’.  
The capability approach10 is a broad normative framework rooted in a philosophical 
tradition that values individual freedoms, and is used for the evaluation and assessment 
of  individual wellbeing, social arrangements and the design of policies and proposals 
about social change. The approach conceptualises “good” development as freedom 
constituted by “human capabilities”, rather than only as national income or people’s 
subjective preferences. Income does not tell us who has the money or what it is used for, 
while preferences may be subject to adaptations in the light of poor living, such that one 
comes to accommodate limited opportunities and reduce aspirations for the future. The 
core focus of the approach is on the effective opportunities people have to be and to do 
what they have reason to value. It highlights substantive freedoms (‘capabilities’), and 
                                                            
9 See Walker, M., & McLean, M. Professional education, capabilities and contributions to the public good. (2013). 
London: Routledge. 
10 See Sen, A. Development as Freedom. (1999). Oxford: Oxford University Press. and Sen, A. The Idea of 
Justice. (2009). London: Allen Lane. See also  Nussbaum, M. Women and Human Development. (2000). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
 
9 
 
outcomes or what is actually achieved (‘functionings’). Professional ‘beings and doings’ 
that are valuable to the professionals who emerge from higher education would be 
‘ functionings’; such ‘ functionings’ would be proxies for ‘professional capabilities’. 
Importantly, with capability also comes responsibility for what we do, and the 
obligations we owe to others11. The capability approach further takes into account 
intersecting ‘conversion factors’, that is the personal, social and environmental factors 
that shape our ability to transform our means to achieve into capabilities and 
functionings. This includes, in my view, structures of inequality such as race, class, 
gender, and so on. Finally, agency is significant for Sen; we are not passive spectators in 
our own development but active agents who makes choices, albeit under specific 
contextual circumstances12.  
  
                                                            
11Sen, A. The Idea of Justice. (2009). London: Allen Lane. 
12 Ibid (n.11)  
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Figure 1: Formation of public-good functionings 
 
The approach can be used as a normative framework to tell us what information we 
should look at - do people have valuable capabilities and who has them - if we are to 
judge how well someone’s life is going.  More broadly it can be used as an evaluative 
framework to conceptualise, measure and evaluate human wellbeing13. What matters in 
arriving at these assessments, for Sen14 is the lives that people can actually live – what they 
are able to do and to be (such as having access to legal services and being treated fairly). 
                                                            
13 Crocker, D. A., & Robeyns, I. 'Capability and Agency', (2010), in  Morris, C. W. Ethics and economics. 
(2010). Amartya Sen, 40-59. 
14 Sen, A. The Idea of Justice. (2009). London: Allen Lane. 
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It also provides a framework for an examination and understanding of the purposes of 
universities and hence of legal education settings, including the clinical, because it 
encourages us to consider individual opportunities for wellbeing achievement and 
agency in and through higher education. Through a capabilities lens, higher education is 
not solely a means for individuals to achieve economic gains through acquiring 
knowledge and skills for employment. Instead, the approach asks us how higher 
education is contributing to human development15, by recognising an expansion of the 
capabilities and functionings that people have reason to value. Thus, various higher 
education studies have explored the approach’s theoretical richness in conceptualizing 
and articulating the changes that need to take place in universities if they are to contribute 
to human development and social justice16.  
To recap the existing eight public-good professional capabilities on mine and Monica’s 
list (see table 1), these were: informed vision; knowledge and skills; affiliation; resilience; 
social and collective struggle; emotional reflexivity; integrity; and, confidence and 
                                                            
15 Haq, ul M. ‘The human development paradigm’ (2003), in S. Fukuda-Parr and A.V. Kumar (Eds) 
Readings in Human Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17-34 
16 See for example Walker. M. Higher Education Pedagogies. (2006). Maidenhead: Open University Press & 
SRHE and Boni, S. And Walker, M. Higher Education and Global Human Development. (2016). London and 
New York: Routledge. among others.  
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assurance17. All the capabilities are important and any trade-offs would need careful and 
wide deliberation. 
Table 1: Public-good professional capabilities extrapolated from empirical functionings, 
Walker and McLean, 2013 
Examples of Functionings   Professional capability 
Understanding how the profession is 
shaped by historical and current socio-
economic, political context nationally and 
globally; understanding how structures 
shape individual lives; being able to 
imagine alternative futures. 
1. Informed vision 
Care and respect for diverse people; 
communicating professional knowledge 
in an accessible way/courtesy and 
patience. 
2. Affiliation (solidarity) 
Perseverance in difficult circumstances. 3. Resilience 
Promoting human rights; identifying 4. Social and collective struggle 
                                                            
17 Walker, M., & McLean, M. Professional education, capabilities and contributions to the public good. (2013). 
London: Routledge. 
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spaces for social change to reduce 
injustice. 
Empathy/narrative imagination; 
compassion.  
5. Emotions (emotional reflexivity after 
July 2012) 
Acting ethically. 6. Integrity 
Having confidence in the worthwhileness 
of one’s professional work; having 
confidence to act for change. 
7. Assurance and confidence 
Having a firm, critical grounding in 
disciplinary, academic knowledge; being 
enquiring, critical, evaluative, 
imaginative, creative and flexible. 
8.Knowledge and skills 
 
In our South Africa law case study, functionings included: being self-aware and reflexive; 
being conscious of what a person wants to achieve as a professional and one’s values; and, 
being able to decide which career direction to move in. Students identified that it is 
important to have a sense of self-belief and self-confidence in yourself as a lawyer. Most 
felt it important that each individual is able to choose their career path autonomously. For 
many, being a lawyer in itself was inherently tied up with acting in the public good. 
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Rohan, a lecturer, saw law as a profession that intrinsically involves acting in the interest 
of others, who lack the legal skills to defend their own interests. In other words, he said, 
“there is value in the training of the attorney in that it’s a profession in the interest of other 
persons”18. 
Our eight professional capabilities are open to debate and to changes, and we welcome 
this. Moreover, we did not claim that these capabilities are universal. They were 
developed in the specific context of transformation seeking but highly unequal post-
apartheid South Africa so that the list was understood to be the capabilities that would 
equip future professionals to act for the public good. However, we did argue that a 
normative capability set, such as the one proposed, can reveal injustices and also 
possibilities for working towards non-ideal justice in practice settings, and this argument 
would be widely relevant.  
Can we, should we, then make space for a distinctively epistemic capability – beyond 
knowledge and skills - on the list? 
 
 
                                                            
18 Walker, M., McLean, M., Dison, A. and Vaughan, R. ‘Higher Education and Poverty Reduction: The 
Formation of Public Good’ (2010)., Unpublished paper. School of Education: University of Notthingham. pp.138 
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WHY EPISTEMIC JUSTICE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 
Here is my argument for epistemic justice and a corresponding capability. In making my 
case, bear in mind that I take for granted that what is required for fairness is a foundation 
of proficiency in technical legal reasoning, knowledge of law, and the constraints of 
procedure – they play a central role in working with clients and supply the bounds within 
which epistemic justice must work. 
My claim is that legal educators, lawyers and other legal professionals should care about 
epistemic justice and care about doing epistemic justice in their own practice actions 
across all branches of the law, whether the injustices generate micro or macro exclusions.  
Access to equality and fairness before the law for all, and, understanding the law in more 
mundane and more dramatic contexts matters in a just society. Legal educators – 
including but not confined to clinical legal educators - train and educate future legal 
practitioners so what they do matters too for a just society and for a legal system which 
is oriented to the public good of all and not just the few. How then might our own 
epistemic conduct be more just in the face of the discrimination arising when unfair biases 
cause people to underestimate the credibility of certain individuals and groups, often 
socially disadvantaged groups or those different from ourselves. Such prejudices can 
occur in a great diversity of communicative exchanges and can negatively impact on 
decision-making in legal contexts.  
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FRICKER’S ‘FAILURE FIRST’ METHOD 
Specific attention to epistemic injustice can alert us to justice gaps and blind spots; it is 
what philosopher Miranda Fricker19 calls a methodological approach of ‘failure first’20. 
She explains that it is often revealing to start with the negative, to begin with a picture of 
how things will tend, under the relevant socio-historical circumstances, to go wrong. 
Epistemic justice is then best conceived as always sustained under tension, she says. Of 
course, these tensions will differ from society to society and we should each consider the 
claims and argument in relation to the specificity of our own contexts.  
The context for my first illustrative example is apartheid South Africa in May 1976 just 
six weeks before the history-changing Soweto student resistance erupted. The occasion is 
the lengthy Supreme Court trial of nine student leaders from the Black People's 
Convention (BPC) and the South African Students' Organization (SASO). The banning 
orders of charismatic black consciousness activist, Steve Biko, were relaxed so that he 
could testify on their behalf.21 In the example, Biko is giving evidence before white, 
                                                            
19 Fricker, M. ‘Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability’. (2015). In G. Hull (Ed.) The Equal 
Society. Cape Town: UCT Press, 73-90 
20 Ibid, 2015, pp.3  
21 The nine were found guilty under the Terrorism Act and sentenced to periods of imprisonment 
on Robben Island. Eighteen months later Biko himself would die of injuries sustained during interrogation. 
His death stunned and shocked the world. But not Jimmy Kruger, the then Minister of all things - Justice, 
who stated that Biko’s death “left him cold”. 
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Afrikaner Judge Boshoff, a man clearly skeptical of the epistemic capabilities of Africans and 
their ability to understand democracy or the concept of one person one vote. There is 
epistemic injustice at work here in the judge’s prejudiced refusal to accept black Africans as 
credible knowers. After an exchange as to whether or not there are any examples of one 
man [sic] one vote in any African country, Boshoff asserts (and the irony would not be 
lost on anyone with some knowledge of apartheid): “Yes but democracy is really only a 
success if the people who have the right to vote can intelligently and honestly apply a 
vote… I mean surely you must know who you are voting for, what you are voting about.  
Assuming that they vote on foreign investment, what does a peasant know about foreign 
investment?”. And later, “if we have to debate whether this government should go on 
the gold standard or go off the gold standard will you feel you know enough about it to 
be able to cast an intelligent vote about that... such that the government should be based 
on that vote?”22. For the judge, black South Africans simply cannot be credible as knowers 
or tellers about democracy locked as he is into a decades long belief that blacks were 
inferior, “unable to formulate their thoughts without white guidance” as Biko23 wrote. 
This is a vivid example of failing to accept someone’s testimony because of racial prejudice, 
and hence a failure to recognize black South Africans as capable of transmitting 
                                                            
22 Biko, S. I Write What I Like. (1978). Northlands: Picador Press, pp.145 
23 Ibid, (1978)., pp.98 
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knowledge about their own situation and coming to their own judgements about a different 
way of doing things. 
Here is a further example of epistemic failure. Some of you may recall the murder of black 
teenager Stephen Lawrence in London24, one night in 1993, while waiting with his friend 
Duwayne Brooks for a bus to get home. Brooks saw a group of five or six white youths 
on the opposite side of the street, moving towards them. Brooks claimed that he heard 
one of Lawrence's assailants saying, “what, what, nigger?” as they all quickly crossed the 
road and “engulfed” Lawrence. As the attackers forced Lawrence down and stabbed him, 
Brooks began running, and shouted for his friend to run with him. They both ran, but 
Lawrence collapsed and bled to death after 130 yards. For a whole generation, Brooks 
said, the effect of the case was seismic, a moment when many lost trust in the police, the 
judiciary and politicians. In the wake of the murder, the police embarked on a campaign 
of harassment – not of the alleged perpetrators- but astonishingly of Brooks. The 
campaign would go on for years. At first they tried to discredit his evidence, then 
attempted to ruin him personally. There were regular arrests, the charges either quietly 
dropped or defeated. The point here is that Duwayne Brooks – who was there – was 
discounted as a credible witness simply because he was young, male and black. He was 
                                                            
24 Bowling, B. ‘Stephen Lawrence: his death changed British law forever but trust in police has yet to 
recover.’ (2018). Available at https://theconversation.com/stephen-lawrence-his-death-changed-british-
law-forever-but-trust-in-police-has-yet-to-recover-95091 
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wronged and undermined specifically in his capacity and credibility as a knower because 
of prejudice on the part of the police and others. Systemic and individual racial prejudice 
triumphed over the evidence of Duwayne Brooks and over justice for Stephen Lawrence 
because of these epistemic wrongs. 
Here is one final example. In Rochdale, England in the 2000s25, police launched an 
investigation into the town’s sex gangs. Yet, despite powerful evidence against them, their 
child victims were written off as ‘unreliable witnesses’ who, according to the Crown 
Prosecution Service, had made ‘lifestyle choices’ to become ‘prostitutes’. The police hadn’t 
interviewed Amber one of the victims. Instead, they had arrested her — on suspicion of 
procuring a child into prostitution. Her crime? Accompanying a friend who was four 
months younger to the kebab shop where some of the abusers hung out. Yet at 15, she was 
an under-age victim herself, meanwhile, her sister, Ruby, had been raped by a married 
Asian man at the age of 12, and subsequently had an abortion. Or the senior officer who 
said to Maggie Oliver26, “Maggie, let’s be honest about this. What are these kids ever going 
to contribute to society?” he said. “In my opinion, they should have just been drowned at 
birth.” 
                                                            
25 See Oliver, M. One Brave Detective’s Battle To Expose The Rochdale Child Abuse Scandal. (2019). London: 
John Blake. for powerful account of the case.  
26 Ibid, (2019). 
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These are all dramatic examples, but they are also real, not made up scenarios. They serve 
to alert us to the potential and actual consequences of epistemic failures in societies. 
Readers could no doubt think of many more examples of the law at work, which are more 
or less epistemically fair and just, more or less every day.  
 
MIRANDA FRICKER’S “EPISTEMIC CONTRIBUTION CAPABILITY” AND THE 
FUNCTIONING OF BECOMING AND BEING AN EPISTEMIC CONTRIBUTOR 
Fricker27 argues that the capability for epistemic contribution - and I would add the 
functioning of being an epistemic contributor, too - should be a central capability on any 
list. It is fundamental to human flourishing to have the opportunity and freedom to give 
and receive information and understanding, to be a credible knower and teller in society, 
and to participate in society’s meaning-making, an opportunity denied to Steve Biko, 
Duwayne Brooks and Tom Robinson. Two forms of epistemic materials contribute: 
informational (including evidence, doubt, hypothesis, and argumentation), and 
interpretational (making sense, alternative ways of seeing). To this end, Fricker outlines 
two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial (not listened to because of who you are) and 
                                                            
27 Fricker, M. ‘Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability’. (2015). In G. Hull (Ed.) The Equal 
Society. Cape Town: UCT Press, 73-90 
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hermeneutical (not having the means to communicate intelligibly to others about 
something and hence not being an equal participant in the generation of shared meaning).   
Hermeneutical injustice is structural (as in the Lawrence case which later revealed 
structural racism in the police force). It is evident in attempts to contribute and participate 
in social meaning-making and hence in attempts to make an experience intelligible to 
oneself or to someone else, for example, experiences of racism or sexual harassment 
before there was a social understanding to understand this form of harassment and other 
social exclusions. Another example might be that of post-traumatic stress disorder 
experienced by soldiers (and others). Before we had a name for this, persons suffering 
this form of trauma were labelled as cowards, or depressed, or even malingering – there 
was no name to communicate or acknowledge their suffering. 
Hermeneutical injustice also arises when the injustice is understood by the powerless 
(such as among black South Africans under apartheid) but is still not communicable to 
those with power because they will not or cannot hear because the person speaking may 
be a single mother on benefits, a migrant, working class, and so on. Experiences that are 
outside of what is marked out as the norm are not heard or acknowledged, and hence not 
cared about. This unequal participation in generating social meanings generates 
structural hermeneutic marginalization of a person or group in the absence of non-
distorted discursive resources among the dominant. There are compelling examples of 
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thus under apartheid in Miriam Tlali’s 1968 novel (republished in 2004), Between Two 
Worlds28, based on her own experiences. For example, she reveals the epistemic 
obtuseness of her white colleagues with regard to the accepted narrative of South 
African society. Thus, one remarks that, “the critics overseas are ill-informed about the 
true situation. They only receive false information. South Africa is a most peaceful 
country. People are free to go where they like, and say what they feel”29. For Mrs 
Stein – and others like her there is a closed hermeneutic loop. 
In both cases of hermeneutic injustice people are denied epistemic functionings; they 
cannot be epistemic contributors.  
The second form, testimonial injustice30, arises through a deficit of credibility owing to 
prejudice in the hearer’s judgment about the speaker (Duwayne Brooks was not believed 
because of who he was). Philosopher Michael Sullivan31 explains that in the case of 
criminal law, opportunities for epistemic injustice abound because practices in the legal 
system are unable to understand the experiences of others in difficult situations of which 
the legal practitioners may have no knowledge. We may also find disparities in 
                                                            
28 Tlali, M. Between two worlds. (2004). Broadview Press. 
29 Tlali, M. Between two worlds. (2004). Broadview Press., pp.207 
30 Fricker, M. Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of Knowing. (2007). Oxford; Oxford University Press 
31 Sullivan, M. ‘Epistemic Justice and the Law’ (2017). in Kidd. I., Medina, J, and Pohlhaus, G. Jr (Eds.). The 
Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. (2017) London & New York: Routledge 
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sentencing for similar offences and these, he says, are not unrelated to social power and 
epistemic authority. These are real practical effects and consequences. 
It may also take pre-emptive form, when, for example a lecturer does not call on a student 
to respond, to enter the debate and so on because they are assumed – even before they 
can speak – not to be credible about the subject under discussion. Hookway describes this 
as “the participant perspective”32  where someone is not recognized as competent to 
participate in activities whose content is intrinsically epistemic – they are not invited to 
contribute, or their contributions may be disregarded in furthering the discussion. He 
points out that if we come to lack confidence in our ability to contribute, this eventually 
attacks “also our ability to properly participate in epistemic activities at all”33. In higher 
education, students from working class or migrant backgrounds may lack confidence and 
may be made to feel inadequate.  In this case students would be both non-knowers and 
non-participants and subject to pedagogic injustices as a secondary effect. A further 
example might be in court where a judge overrules all attempts by a defence lawyer who 
attempts to portray his client to the jury on the basis that for the judge the client is simply 
not credible and his or her story may be simply not allowed to be heard. Jose Medina thus 
                                                            
32 Hookway, C. ‘Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker’. (2010). Episteme: A Journal of 
Social Epistemology, 7 (2):151-163 
33 Ibid, 2010  
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stresses that epistemic injustice is interactive and performative, it is made in 
communicative spaces34. 
In both hermeneutical and testimonial injustice, the primary exclusion is being wronged 
as a knower.  But – as noted - this gives rise to secondary wrongs in practice, for example 
not being believed by a judge, jury or a magistrate or ignored in a university classroom. 
Both hermeneutical and testimonial forms also work together in practice. As Medina 
explains, “testimonial insensitivities and hermeneutical insensitivities converge and 
feed each other”35. Both forms are also iterative so that repetitions secure the injustices. 
If a person is repeatedly not taken seriously as a knower, they lose conﬁdence in their 
own ability. The capability for epistemic contribution is frustrated by not appreciating or 
mistrusting people as knowers and is indicative of wider structures of inequality. 
Localized prejudices and injustices may be utterly disastrous for the subject, especially if 
they are repeated frequently so that the injustice is persistent. As she further explains 
being wronged in one’s capacity as a giver of knowledge “can cut deep”36.  
The strength and reach of Fricker’s approach is the way she identiﬁes intrinsically 
                                                            
34 Medina, J. ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice 1’ (2017). in Kidd. I., Medina, J, and Pohlhaus, G. Jr 
(Eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. (2017). London & New York: Routledge 
35 Medina, J. ‘Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared 
Hermeneutical Responsibilities.’ (2012). Social Epistemology, 26 (2), 201-220, pp.206 
36 Medina, J. ‘Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice 1’ (2017). in Kidd. I., Medina, J, and Pohlhaus, G. Jr 
(Eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. (2017). London & New York: Routledge 
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epistemic forms of injustice – wrongs done to someone as a knower; yet egalitarian 
epistemic contributions are fundamental to human well-being and, she argues, to 
political freedoms. Fricker explains that in any cultural context, the question of who gets 
to contribute epistemically to shared knowledge and/or shared social understandings in 
any given practical context, is a matter of epistemic equality or inequality. It is also 
fundamentally relational in its process, practices and effects. We flourish (not or) as 
epistemic contributors in relationships with and through others. In oppressive contexts 
(racism, sexism, classism etc.) the powerful undermine others with less power in their 
epistemic capacity, undermining them in their humanness and dignity. It is humiliating 
and demeaning and reduces confidence and, Fricker says, the development of intellectual 
courage. We end up not being at all sure of what we think ourselves and our personhood 
is diminished. 
To be sure, those who hold political and social power, whether in the broader society or 
in higher education institutions (or both), also wield epistemic power. Anticipating many 
of the current debates on epistemic justice, in 1978 Biko wrote, “that the most potent 
weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”37. Even earlier, in 
1767 French lawyer, Joseph Servan, explained that, “when you have thus formed the 
chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you will then be able to pride yourselves on 
                                                            
37 Biko, S. I Write What I Like. (1978). Northlands: Picador Press, pp.49 
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guiding them and being their masters…. [on] the habitual union of ideas…on the soft 
fibres of the brain, is founded the unshakeable base of the soundest empires”38.39 
At stake is that our epistemic lives whether in higher education or elsewhere are not 
abstractions but active, practical and relational, done well or less well40. Fricker’s 
epistemic contribution capability is fundamental for accessing critical knowledge and 
requires pedagogical and other conditions for critical reasoning and dialogue to achieve 
“the epistemically multi-perspectival context in which citizens may come to believe 
truths in the mode of knowledge”41. Ideas and knowledge matter for participation in 
inclusive meaning-making (and hence to politics, education, the professions, and so on) 
so that who has access to these epistemic goods at various layers of society is then a matter 
of justice.  
                                                            
38 Servan, J.M.A, Discours sur l'administration de la justice criminelle. (1767) cited in Foucault, M. Discipline 
and Punish. (1977). London: Penguin Books., pp.102-103 
39 This includes the impact of colonization on knowledge and whose knowledge and knowledge 
contributions are regarded as credible. See, for example, De Sousa Santos’s (2015) decoloniality argument 
for inclusive “ecology of knowledges”, for global cognitive justice, and for a more expansive and 
generous ways of seeing, thinking and knowing in universities and elsewhere.  
40 Barker S.R., Crerar C. and Goetze, T. ‘Harms and wrongs in epistemic practice.’ (2018).  In: Barker S.R., 
Crerar C. and Goetze T., (eds.) Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice. (2018). Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplements, 84. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK., pp. 1-21. 
41 Fricker, M. ‘Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability’. (2015). In G. Hull (Ed.) The Equal 
Society. (2015). Cape Town: UCT Press, 73-90., pp.15  
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Fricker42 asserts her basic claim that any epistemic injustice (including exclusions from 
access to and being understood in the context of the law and also in legal professional 
education) wrongs someone both as a giver of knowledge and as a credible informant so 
that a person is prevented from becoming fully who they are. Epistemic oppression 
would constitute a “persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to 
knowledge production, an unwarranted infringement on the epistemic agency of 
knowers”43. Her capability is quite simply, she argues, universally essential to human 
flourishing and hence an egalitarian value because one of our most basic human needs, 
is to use our reason, to sift and evaluate information, to make interpretations and sense 
of our shared lives. All persons should then be able to make epistemic contributions and 
to have such contributions taken up socially, neither rejected nor under-rated – whether 
we are black or white, rich or poor, migrant or citizen, man or women, able-bodied or 
differently-abled, young or old, and so on. Epistemic justice fosters the contestation of 
ideas in the public sphere, and this in turn requires struggling both for personal change 
and conditions and structures of epistemic justice.  Importantly, epistemic justice can be 
contested so that epistemic failure is seldom complete, and structural possibility seldom 
entirely open. In short and to reiterate, ‘thick’ epistemic contributions are fundamental to 
human flourishing; this is important for everyone.   
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THE CASE FOR ADDING A NEW PUBLIC-GOOD PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITY  
Wolff and De-Shalit’s two law-oriented capabilities on their own list44, adapted from that 
of Martha Nussbaum, might be subsets of the epistemic contribution capability45. These 
are: 1) living in a law-abiding fashion - the possibility of being able to live within the law; 
not to be forced to break the law, cheat, or to deceive other people or institutions; and, 2) 
understanding the la - having a general comprehension of the law, its demands, and the 
opportunities it offers to individuals, not standing perplexed before the legal system or 
perplexed in front of a legal practitioner. As one of the legal NGO workers interviewed 
for our South Africa law case study explained: “having a general comprehension of the 
law, I think that’s critical. That informs the relations that we have in society and our 
obligations and the state’s obligations. It’s the glue that keeps it together - and yet people 
don’t understand the law. They don’t understand their rights at an absolute basic level – 
not understanding their rights it means they can’t respect those rights and they can’t 
access those rights”46. For access to the law, one of our case study students supported 
Wolff and De-Shalit in highlighting the importance of lawyers being able to relate to and 
properly communicate with their clients because the legal world can be very alien for 
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people from different backgrounds47: “my clients said that they go to court and then they 
don’t understand what the magistrate is saying, so they come here to the legal aid clinic. 
When I see them, they’re looking for someone to represent them and be able to speak the 
language, the law language. Even if they don’t understand it, they trust us to know ‘Ok, 
what you’re saying is correct’. They’re looking for someone to speak in a different 
language on their behalf’”48.  
In many ways, this mode of communication is related to seeing clients as human and 
respecting them. Thus another student stated: “What is important is that you don’t indulge 
in this legal jargon with indigent clients, stick to the basic language and that’s how you 
respect them as well…you don’t make them feel that ‘I’m superior and you’re inferior’, 
you speak to them, you maintain that professionalism but you try to communicate with 
them on an equal basis, so that they open up”49. A third remarked that, ‘Each client should 
be treated with dignity, not making them feel inferior: “’you are a person, you are special, 
you have your dignity, hold onto that, you’re not the person he [your husband] says you 
are’”50. It is then important to make the law accessible - not expecting people to 
understand legal terms and processes. As the then Dean of the Law Faculty commented, 
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“’You can’t really do much with a lawyer who can understand the most arcane and 
complicated statute…but can’t even translate that into plain English for a client’”51. 
In short, the legal system should not unfairly prejudice the vulnerable. As one lawyer 
told us, “‘people in low-income areas [or it could be under conditions of a lack of 
democratic freedoms as in apartheid South Africa] do not have an understanding of their 
rights…I think we as a profession have a duty there’”52. Another lawyer working for an 
NGO felt that knowledge about your own society was possibly as significant as the 
knowledge of the law itself, “knowledge of not only the theory but also, and maybe more 
importantly, a knowledge of what’s happening in society, and to be aware of what, and 
how the rules of society operate and how those rules can be used creatively to find 
solutions to society’s problems”53. A third, who worked for a legal professional standards 
body, felt it was important for professionals to be aware of the effect they can have 
through their work, “I think professionals can play a role. I think lawyers, urban planners, 
engineers, and so on, when they do the kind of work they do, should have in mind the 
makeup of society and plan and engineer in accordance with that. So I firmly believe that 
professionals must always be aware of their role in society at all times”54. Finally, one of 
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the students remarked that professionals can enable people’s access to justice, “for them 
to actually know that there is a way out…you don’t have to sit in that same situation”55.  
In other words, everyone ought to be enabled and respected as an epistemic contributor, and 
the law has a part to play in enabling this capability. 
In arguing for adding a new public-good professional capability, there are two 
intersecting levels in play (see figure 1): 1) the level of general capabilities – that is our 
freedoms to be and do in ways we have reason to value for well-being in the general 
population and, arising from that, the specific capabilities that would enable legal 
practitioners professionally to foster law specific capabilities such as those of Wolff and 
De-Shalit56 and to advance epistemic justice. If some but not others are unable to access 
or understand the framework of human rights and legal rights - or even everyday legal 
processes governing the purchase and sale of property or rental agreements, or divorce 
law, or family law affecting the rights of children, or even corporate law - that obtain in 
a society, then we have reason to ask how fair the law or legal processes and outcomes 
are. 2) The second level is that of legal professionals who themselves needs access to the 
capability in order to value it, understand it, and foster it for others, and clinical legal 
education in particular can play a significant role in advancing this capability and 
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fucntioning. The advance or constraint of the epistemic contribution capability – both 
generally and specifically for legal professionals - then offers a tool to identify injustices 
and think about how to move towards a fair and inclusive legal system and society.  
I therefore argue for adding another professional capability - that of epistemic 
contribution - to be fostered in law students through an appropriate curriculum and 
pedagogical arrangements and - through legal practitioners enabled and made available 
to the public at large. It is a capability which seems especially important in clinical legal 
education in universities and in practicing law for the public good. 
 
EDUCATION AND DEVELOPING THE CAPABILITY 
Fricker’s conceptualization requires educational work57. Epistemic justice fosters the 
contestation of ideas in the public sphere (this could be a university or on a  micro 
level, a university classroom) and this in turn requires fostering pedagogical 
conditions of epistemic justice. Epistemic injustice not only blocks the flow of knowledge 
but also the flow of evidence, doubts, critical ideas and other epistemic inputs. Epistemic 
injustice may preclude some people from speaking for themselves or formulating their 
own knowledge claims. Our capability for epistemic contribution, Fricker explains, is 
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developed through all kinds of social (pedagogical) encounters which involve sharing 
information and forms of social understanding, and in which we are both givers and 
receivers in the project of making meaning; it requires (relational) “epistemic 
reciprocity”, such that we are all recognized as knowers across higher education and 
professional settings58. By way of contrast, epistemic injustice in university classrooms 
and clinical practice settings might include silencing, having less status in the 
communicative practices, being marginalized, being discriminated against, and so on59. 
Thus, epistemic justice and injustice processes are central to our lives in education.  
Higher education is demonstrably a space where epistemic justice matters; it is after all 
where being a knower and being able to act as a knower to gain epistemic access and 
develop epistemic agency is rather important.  In the context of higher education 
testimonial injustice can include, as noted earlier in citing Hookway, the asking of 
questions which are ignored because of prejudice against the speaker60.  As Fricker 
explains, it extends to cases where a speaker (for example, a student) “expresses a 
personal opinion to a hearer, or airs a value judgment or tries out a new idea or 
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hypothesis on a given audience”61. The asking or contributing of questions is then, says 
Fricker, potentially vulnerable to a prejudicial credibility deficit. This may be exacerbated 
where the student’s communicative performance – either or both their expressive style 
or confidence in English - is also in play62. The point is that the credibility judgment 
includes, says Fricker, both what is said and the speaker. Such pedagogic “failure first”63 
exposes dependence on social uptake so that, while some are enabled by just conditions 
to make their epistemic contributions, others find their capability ‘thins’ or disappears 
altogether in some contexts. In the pedagogical context epistemic injustice, and especially 
prejudice-based testimonial injustice, thus unfairly increases academic and 
communicative labour for those whose epistemic contributions are filtered when 
students come together pedagogically, such that this can be identified also as an agency 
injustice.  
Thus, Fricker suggests that societies (including education institutions) train our 
sensibilities in ways which are flawed, given the prejudices that exist64. The virtue 
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required she proposes, is “reflexive critical awareness”65 in order to identify how far our 
suspected prejudices have influenced our judgment.  We can learn to become virtuous 
hearers through ethical reflection where we are put in a position to know better and 
reflexive critical awareness is placed pedagogically within our reach; it must constitute 
part of the conditions of educational possibility. Privileged hearers needs to learn how 
consciously to revise their epistemic judgements upwards.  
Pedagogical conditions would need to enable processes for the epistemic capability to 
take the shape of supportive opportunities for developing the virtue: co-operation, taking 
pleasure in the achievements [learning] of others, judging others to have dignity, 
compassion, respect and recognition, and so on, would characterize pedagogy and ethical 
learning to advance the capability. Bohman highlights students being placed in a position 
to learn the skill of initiating dialogue or making a proposal about an issue66.  Secondly, 
he notes learning the ability to engage productively in argument and counter-argument 
(in ways that are respectful of and value all identities). Thirdly, students need skills in 
finding ways to harmonize all proposals on the table, that is, in coming to agreement. 
Finally, students need to learn how to persuade in debate but not to manipulate. 
Pedagogical conditions would need to provide the freedom processes for the epistemic 
capability to take the shape of actual opportunities: co-operation, taking pleasure in the 
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achievements [learning] of others, judging others to have dignity, compassion, respect 
and recognition, and so on, would characterize pedagogy and ethical learning to advance 
the capability. I think therefore that the form of education and training that will foster 
public-good professional values is a form of praxis pedagogy which is transformative, 
critical, and attentive both to knowledge and to responsible action in society67. Praxis is 
understood here to involve both the integration of academic knowledge (acquired at 
university) and practical knowledge about how one lives as a professional, as a citizen and 
as a human being.  
According to Fricker, if supportive conditions are in place, no one with relevant epistemic 
materials to offer would be prevented from doing so for “epistemically irrelevant” 
reasons, for example, because they were poor, or a migrant, or different in some way68. 
All students then ought to be able “to contribute to the common cognitive store 
[knowledge and understanding] in this pedagogical way, and thereby enjoy the mutual 
regard and trust that go with epistemic reciprocity”69.  Students would need themselves 
to develop, and be supported pedagogically in developing, virtues of being confident, 
inquiring, curious, probing and engaged.  Pedagogical processes would need to be 
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enabling of the learning of all students, creating spaces both to acquire and contribute to 
knowledge in the classroom, and searching for meaning and making judgements about 
trustworthy knowledge.   
We need, I think, a measure of education-facing optimism that there are epistemic spaces 
of possibility if we cultivate the appropriate virtues. Plurality (for example diversity 
among students and among who gets to be a lawyer) – potentially if not guaranteed - 
offers possibility for epistemic dissidence by means of a diversity of interpretative 
resources and practices and the inclusion and consideration of as many positional 
objectivities as possible. Plurality is of special importance to universities where scholars, 
teachers and students require inclusive epistemic freedoms in order to “to inquire, to 
question and probe established views and new visions without fear of retribution or 
silencing”70.  Free and open exchanges in university classrooms and public spaces are ‘a 
necessary condition for the pursuit of knowledge’ and for developing our epistemic 
capabilities. 
If we agree with Stefan Collini that, whatever else they might do, universities are 
dedicated to the pursuit of understanding through open-ended inquiry, then even at this 
minimalist level, we must foster the epistemic contribution capability for all students as 
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future professionals71. 
Nonetheless, Fricker arguably, and we ourselves, may underestimate the social difficulty 
in developing such virtues. Students from advantaged backgrounds may fail to see or 
understand suffering and deprivation, or to know it exists but be indifferent if there is no 
impact on their own lives and careers (especially making money). Simply thinking about 
the problem or having access to rational knowledge (such as through digital stories) is 
important, but may not always be enough to the moral shifts required. Experiential 
learning may then be especially powerful and have the potential to change the way we 
see or think about the world in ways that abstract debates including rational deliberation 
about justice for all may fail to do72.  
We might place, say, before, say a group of middle class English students, statistics and 
stories which demonstrate income and class-based inequalities in an area in a community 
in which legal clinic outreach operates that they can deliberate, coolly and rationally and 
reach articulate agreement that the situation is morally wrong - but yet find them 
unchanged at the level of moral conduct. There are numerous instances of people with 
apparently liberal views who are “viscerally prejudiced”73 in practice, even though at an 
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abstract level they would acknowledge that such prejudice (of race, class, gender, 
religion, nation, and so on) is morally wrong. Equally, we may find a student suddenly 
confronted with interactions with a real person, who embodies his or her fears of the 
other, responding in a morally good way. An example from history is provided by David 
Brion Davis by Drew Gilpin Faust of his third book in a trilogy on the history of slavery 
in the U.S.  Davis’s overarching interest is in how ideas are refracted through real human 
problems in the everyday world74.  For example, his concern with how a human being 
can come to deny and obliterate the humanity of others. For Davis slavery came to be a 
vehicle for examining how humans shape and are shaped by moral dilemmas and how 
their ideas come to influence their society and world. His own epiphany occurred while 
serving in the U.S. army towards the end of World War 2.  On a troopship headed for 
Germany and ordered to descend into the hold and enforce the prohibition against 
gambling he discovered  hundreds of black soldiers whom he had not even known were 
on board- segregated in slave like conditions.  Gilpin Faust suggests that these army 
experiences introduced him to the realities of racial prejudice and cruelty that he had 
never imagined still existed75. The point is we can act morally without deliberation76, so 
we cannot assume that rational deliberation will enable a transparent awareness of 
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actions and reasons for action and necessarily lead to moral action, although of course it 
may, especially if combined with particular kinds of experiences which trigger moral 
awareness. Higher education should probably offer both abstract deliberation (a core 
function of higher learning), but combine this with the potential power of experiential 
learning. It may then be that Nussbaum’s “narrative imagination”77- being able to 
understand the world from the perspective of someone different from oneself - is a crucial 
aspect of the justice-facing epistemic contribution capability  
‘Combined capabilities’ 
Because the person is understood as a social being, shaped by and involved in structures, 
processes and relationships in her society, ‘combined capabilities’ are of special concern78. 
These consist in “internal capabilities” that is, “developed states of the person him/herself 
that are, so far as the person herself is concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of 
the requisite functions”79.  To achieve a functioning requires both the internal capability 
(ability, aspirations, and so forth) and supportive uptake conditions for the actual 
exercise of a functioning (actually doing it and not only being able to do it) - these become 
combined capabilities. Claassen comments that “only the latter are full capabilities, 
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providing us with effective freedom, with the real opportunities to do or be something”80.  
Of course, social conditions also shape the development of internal capabilities, for 
example, in the case of aspirations having access to teachers or family or significant others 
to foster the capability. Without suitable opportunities, an internal capability may not 
develop well, or it may develop but not be achieved.  
Figure 2: Combined capabilities 
It is then combined capabilities that matter for assessments of justice and for students and 
others having the freedoms to shape their own lives. Thus, the epistemic contribution 
capability would need to be one such combined capability and hence to be achievable as 
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a functioning for legal students, legal practitioners and wider publics. Indeed, all the 
capabilities on mine and Monica’s list would be combined capabilities so that both the 
capability and its achievement would be important in assessments of epistemic justice in 
professional education processes and outcomes81. 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
By doing particular kinds of educational things universities educate particular kinds of 
professionals. These particular kinds of things ought to be to educate public- good 
professionals, with the capabilities to act responsibly towards others. In the arena of 
professional, including clinical legal education, this ought to translate into human 
development in which students learn not only knowledge and skills but the difference 
between simply having a professional skill on one hand, and on the other having the 
commitment to use that skill to the benefit of others and to continue questioning and 
extending expert knowledge and its applications.  
In our project, Monica McLean and I were concerned with the education of professionals 
who are, ethical professional agents who act to remove injustice, who are able to see more 
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humanely; our personal choices matter for social justice.  We then all need to accept 
responsibility for which epistemic practices enable and which constrain. Agents – that is 
ourselves and others- produce and reproduce cultures and the unequal power relations 
which benefit the already advantaged. The assertion of responsibility for (epistemic) 
justice does not allow any group, which complies with, or assists in constructing 
structures of domination, or fails to work with others to ameliorate conditions, to get a 
‘free pass’, and this seems important everywhere. Thus Iris Marion Young advances a 
“social connection” model of responsibility, which “finds that all those who contribute 
by their actions to structural processes with some unjust outcomes share responsibility 
for the injustice”82 - we ought to be held responsible and obligated to work towards 
removing this as integral to our professional ethics if we continue to be part of our society.  
Epistemic ignorance (or blindness) is then not excusable if the tools exist to enable us to 
see differently and see better and a person or group nonetheless refuses to embrace the 
conceptual resources that would allow full understanding of domination and epistemic 
inequalities. Moreover ,  in  th is  way e f fec t ive ly  to  reduce  or  destroy the 
epistemic resources people need to make sense of their own lives and to communicate 
these lives to others is to deny participation in a shared way of life. 
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I hope I have shown that epistemic justice matters for its effects not only on the epistemic 
but for the wider impact exclusions can have on individual lives and structures, and 
hence that the epistemic contribution capability merits a place on any list of professional 
capabilities.  It may require some rethinking of the eight capabilities in Walker and 
McLean (2013)83. My argument has been that epistemic freedoms matter for our 
flourishing lives as citizens, as educators, as professionals. Thus, for equality all students 
(and their future clients) ought to have access to the capability and to have such 
contributions taken up socially - neither rejected nor under-rated.  
Of course, there are other points of view.  For example, a study by the Carnegie 
Foundation of Law schools in the US and Canada found that students there were 
discouraged from relating legal cases to the complexity of real-life cases, or to think 
through the social consequences or ethical aspects of conclusions84. The report concluded 
that, “in their all-consuming first year, students are told to set aside their desire for justice. 
They are warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the people in the cases 
they discuss cloud their legal analyses. This warning does help students escape the grip 
of misconceptions about how the law works as they hone their analytic skills”85.  Yet, as 
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Sullivan warns, “when the misconceptions are not addressed directly, students have no 
way of learning when and how their moral concerns may be relevant to their work as 
lawyers and when these concerns could throw them off track”86.  
Finally, then, my basic position is that a critical theory – in this case of an epistemic public-
good professional capability - is premised on the idea that there is no better way of 
knowing the world than by anticipating a better world87. Gramsci poses the challenge in 
this way: “How can the present be welded to the future, so that while satisfying the 
urgent necessities we may work effectively to create and ‘anticipate’ the other”88. For this 
we need intellectual instruments, imagination and agency to struggle towards that world 
against the waste of social experiences and distorted and distorting power relations, 
including the epistemic89. Of course, a good critical theory is also profoundly practical 
and it is the practical challenges of professional capabilities that can be answered only by 
what legal educators and their allies will do, now and in the future and under what 
conditions of possibility. In such practical efforts we are reminded by Nelson Mandela 
(himself a trained lawyer before his incarceration) in what might be considered 
capabilities language, that, “to be free [is] to live in a way that respects and enhances the 
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freedoms of others”90. 
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